

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
8                   WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
9                   AT SEATTLE

10 KENNETH MCINTIRE,

11                   Plaintiff,

12                   v.

13 CAROLYN COLVIN,

14                   Defendant.

CASE NO. C15-5070JLR

ORDER REVERSING AND  
REMANDING DECISION  
DENYING BENEFITS FOR  
FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE  
PROCEEDINGS

15                   I. INTRODUCTION

16 Plaintiff Kenneth McIntire appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of the  
17 Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability  
18 insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title II and Title  
19 XVI of the Social Security Act, following a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge  
20 (“ALJ”). The court has considered the ALJ’s decision, the administrative record, and the  
21 parties’ memoranda. Being fully advised, the court REVERSES the Commissioner’s  
22

1 final decision and REMANDS this action to the Commissioner for further administrative  
2 proceedings and rehearing consistent with this order.

## II. BACKGROUND

The facts of the case are set forth in the ALJ's decision (Dkt. # 11-2 at 20-29)<sup>1</sup>, the administrative hearing transcript (Dkt. # 11-2 at 35-62), and the briefs of the parties (Op. Mem. (Dkt. # 18); Resp. (Dkt. # 20); Reply (Dkt. # 19)). They are only briefly summarized here.

8       Mr. McIntire filed an application for disability insurance benefits and SSI on May  
9       14, 2012, alleging disability beginning November 1, 2010. (Dkt #11-5 at 2, 4.) Mr.  
10      McIntire's claims were denied initially on July 26, 2012, and on reconsideration on  
11      October 10, 2012. (Dkt. # 11-4 at 1, 7.) After a hearing held before an ALJ on April 10,  
12      2013 (Dkt. # 11-2 at 35-62) , the ALJ found that Mr. McIntire was not disabled and once  
13      again denied his claims for disability insurance benefits and SSI (*id.* at 20-29). The  
14      Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied Mr. McIntire's  
15      request for review on December 8, 2014, rendering the decision of the ALJ the final  
16      decision of the Commissioner. (Dkt. #11-2 at 1-7.)

17 In his appeal, Mr. McIntire contends that the ALJ erred in three ways. (Op. Mem.  
18 at 1, 3.) First, Mr. McIntire contends that the ALJ erred by failing to give germane  
19 reasons for rejecting the opinion of Alan Itkin, Physician's Assistant, Certified ("PAC").

<sup>1</sup> All of the court's citations to the Administrative Record will be limited to the specific docket number and page number(s) where the item or citation can be found on the court's electronic docketing system commonly referred to as CM/ECF.

1 (Id.) Indeed, the ALJ did not discuss PAC Itkin's opinions or treatment notes at all.  
2 Second, Mr. McIntire contends that the ALJ erred when weighing the opinion evidence  
3 of examining psychologist, Dr. Russell Bragg, Ph.D. (Id.) Third, Mr. McIntire argues  
4 that the ALJ erred by failing to provide legally sufficient reasons for finding Mr. McIntire  
5 himself not fully credible. (Id.) Finally, Mr. McIntire contends that, as a result of these  
6 errors, the court should remand this action to the SSA for an award of benefits. (Id. at 2.)  
7 The court now considers each of these arguments.

### III. ANALYSIS

#### **A. Standard of Review**

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it is free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. *Garrison v. Colvin*, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” *Lingenfelter v. Astrue*, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007)). The court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, but the court must not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. *Lingenfelter v. Astrue*, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” *Andrews v. Shalala*, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).

1       The court will uphold the Commissioner's decision when the evidence is  
2 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. *Burch v. Barnhart*, 400 F.3d 676,  
3 679 (9th Cir. 2005). The court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ "and may  
4 not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely." *Orn*, 495 F.3d at 630; *see also Connell*,  
5 340 F.3d at 874. The court, however, will not reverse the Commissioner's  
6 decision for harmless error, which exists when it is "clear from the record that an ALJ's  
7 error was 'inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.'" *Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Sec.*  
8 *Admin.*, 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); *see also Burch*, 400 F.3d at 679.

10                   **B. Opinion of the Physician's Assistant**

11       PAC Itkin treated Mr. McIntire for more than a year for his lower back pain, from  
12 about January 2011 through at least February 2012. (See Dkt. ## 11-12 at 35; Dkt. #11-  
13 14 at 41.) On September 7, 2011, PAC Itkin concluded that Mr. McIntire had  
14 "significant impingement of the left L5 nerve root." (Dkt. # 11-13 at 56.) PAC Itkin also  
15 stated that "whether or not [Mr. McIntire] will be able to return to any form of gainful  
16 employment does not seem likely at this time." (*Id.*) He opined that Mr. McIntire could  
17 not perform any work, citing Mr. McIntire's positive CT scan and positive myelogram.  
18 (*Id.* at 67, 79.) He noted that applying for disability was "a reasonable avenue for [Mr.  
19 McIntire] to pursue at this time given that he cannot sit or stand for prolonged periods,"  
20 "cannot lift heavy objects, and . . . has significant pain and disability from the findings on  
21 his lumbar spine MRI and physical exam." (Dkt. # 11-11 at 7.) Following treatment on

1 February 27, 2012, PAC Itkin again opined that Mr. McIntire could not return to work.  
 2 (Dkt. # 11-14 at 43.)

3 ALJs are required to articulate “specific and legitimate reasons supported by  
 4 substantial evidence” before discounting or rejecting the opinion of a medically  
 5 acceptable treating source. *Burrell v. Colvin*, 775 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2014); *see*  
 6 *also Molina v. Astrue*, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). But not all healthcare  
 7 providers qualify as “acceptable medical sources.” *See* 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a) (stating  
 8 that only “[l]icensed physicians,” “[l]icensed or certified psychologists,” “[l]icensed  
 9 optometrists,” “[l]icensed podiatrists,” and “[q]ualified speech-language pathologists”  
 10 qualify as “acceptable medical sources”). Medical care providers who do not qualify as  
 11 “acceptable medical sources” are deemed “other sources” by the regulations. 20 C.F.R.  
 12 § 404.1513(d).

13 Both parties agree that PAC Itkin qualifies as an “other source” under the SSA’s  
 14 regulations. (*See* Op. Mem. at 7; Resp. at 2); *see also* 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(1)  
 15 (“Other sources include . . . physicians’ assistants . . .”). Such “other source” testimony  
 16 concerning a claimant’s symptoms or how an impairment affects a claimant’s ability to  
 17 work “*is competent evidence*” and “*cannot* be disregarded without comment.” *Stout*, 454  
 18 F.3d at 1053 (italics in original). “The ALJ may discount testimony from these ‘other  
 19 sources’ if the ALJ ‘gives reasons germane to each witness for doing so.’” *Molina*, 674  
 20 F.3d at 1111 (quoting *Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.*, 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir.  
 21 2010). An ALJ may even completely reject “other source” or lay witness testimony “as  
 22 long as ‘arguably germane reasons’ for dismissing the testimony are noted.” *Woodsum v.*

1   | *Astrue*, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (quoting *Lewis v. Apfel*, 236 F.3d  
2   | 503, 512 (9th Cir. 2001)). Mr. McIntire contends that the ALJ erred, not only by failing to  
3   | provide “arguably germane reasons” for rejecting PAC Itkin’s opinions, but by failing to  
4   | discuss PAC Itkin’s treatment notes and opinions at all. (Op. Mem. at 7-8.)

5                 The Commissioner does not dispute that the ALJ failed to discuss PAC Itkin’s  
6   | treatment notes and opinions and that this was error. (Resp. at 2 (“The ALJ did not  
7   | discuss these forms. . . . Usually, an ALJ must consider the observations of an ‘other  
8   | source’ medical provider, such as a physician assistant.”).) Instead, the Commissioner  
9   | argues that the error was harmless because the ALJ relied on the opinion of Dr. Dennis  
10   | Koukol, M.D., a State agency medical consultant and non-examining medical expert,  
11   | who reviewed the record and concluded that Mr. McIntire’s physical limitations did not  
12   | preclude him from doing light work. (*Id.* at 2-4 (citing Dkt. # 11-2 at 26).) Dr. Koukol in  
13   | turned relied upon the opinions of Dr. David Bauer, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr.  
14   | Karl Goler, M.D., a neurosurgeon, who conducted an independent medical examination  
15   | of Mr. McIntire. (*See* Dkt. ## 11-3 at 39; 11-14 at 67-79.) Those doctors concluded that  
16   | Mr. McIntire had only “mild degenerative changes” in his spine, that there were “no  
17   | objective factors that support[ed Mr. McIntire’s] removal from work,” and that Mr.  
18   | McIntire exhibited “several signs of symptom magnification on examination.” (Dkt.  
19   | # 11-14 at 78-79.) Thus, the Commissioner argues that despite the ALJ’s failure to  
20   | discuss PAC Itkin’s opinions, the ALJ’s decision is nevertheless supported by substantial  
21   | evidence and any error by the ALJ was therefore harmless. (Resp. at 3-4.)

22

1        “[T]he harmless error analysis applies in the social security context. . . .” *Marsh v.*  
2 *Colvin*, --- F.3d ----, 2015 WL 4153858, at \*2 (9th Cir. 2015). Indeed, the court “may not  
3 reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” *Molina v. Astrue*, 674  
4 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). However, “where an ALJ’s error lies in a failure to  
5 properly discuss competent lay testimony favorable to the claimant, a reviewing court  
6 cannot consider the error harmless unless it can confidently conclude that no reasonable  
7 ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a different disability  
8 determination.” *Stout*, 454 F.3d at 1056. The opinions of PAC Itkin are favorable to Mr.  
9 McIntire and in direct contravention to the opinions of Dr. Koukol. Further, as Mr.  
10 McIntire points out, there is no indication that Dr. Koukol had the opportunity to review  
11 PAC Itkin’s treatment records or assessments of Mr. McIntire’s functional limitations.  
12 (See Reply at 2 (citing Dkt. # 11-3 at 34-51).) Thus, the court cannot “confidently  
13 conclude” on this record that no reasonable ALJ when fully crediting the opinions of  
14 PAC Itkin could have reached a different disability determination. Accordingly, the court  
15 cannot find the ALJ’s error in failing to provide germane reasons for rejecting PAC  
16 Itkins’ opinions is harmless.

17              **C. Opinion of the Examining Psychologist**

18        Dr. Russell Bragg, Ph.D., performed a psychological evaluation of Mr. McIntire  
19 on March 23, 2012, for the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services.  
20 (Dkt. # 11-14 at 60.) During Dr. Bragg’s evaluation, Mr. McIntire described his family  
21 and became “so agitated and distressed . . . that he cried uncontrollably and also  
22 development chest pains,” and “was essentially unable to respond to other questions in

1 the interview for at least the next 15 minutes.” (Dkt. #11-14 at 61.) Dr. Bragg found  
 2 Mr. McIntire’s presentation to be consistent with severe anxiety and depression. (*Id.*) He  
 3 concluded that Mr. McIntire’s “mental/emotional state is so labile at the present time that  
 4 it does not appear that he can maintain enough stability to perform any type of work  
 5 reliably.” (*Id.* at 62.)

6 The ALJ noted that Dr. Bragg “report[ed] that he was unable to obtain necessary  
 7 details due to [Mr. McIntire’s] state of distress in the interview . . . .” (Dkt. # 11-2 at  
 8 27.) The ALJ further stated that, although Dr. Bragg gave Mr. McIntire a “Global  
 9 Assessment of Functioning (GAF) of 40,” “due to [Mr. McIntire’s] agitation, such scores  
 10 have questionable validity.”<sup>2</sup> (*Id.*) Overall, the ALJ found that “Dr. Bragg’s evaluation  
 11 ha[d] questionable validity,” and afforded “little weight to Dr. Bragg’s assessment of the  
 12 claimant’s psychological condition.” (*Id.*) Mr. McIntire argues that the ALJ erred by not  
 13 supporting his decision to give Dr. Bragg’s opinion “little weight” with substantial  
 14 evidence and by supplanting Dr. Bragg’s opinion with his own lay assessment. (Op.  
 15 Mem. at 9-10.)

---

16

17 <sup>2</sup>A GAF score of 40 may be associated with serious impairment. See *Cox v. Astrue*, 495  
 18 F.3d 614, 620 n.5 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that a GAF score in the forties may be associated with  
 19 serious impairment in occupational functioning); see also *Pisciotta v. Astrue*, 500 F.3d 1074,  
 20 1076 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (“A GAF score of 41-50 indicates ‘[s]erious symptoms . . . [or] serious  
 21 impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning,’ such as an inability to keep a job.”)  
 22 (quoting Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Text Revision 4th ed. 2000)  
 (“DSM-IVTR”) at 34). The Ninth Circuit, however, has stated that although GAF scores “may  
 differ from work environments in important respects,” and “standing alone,” they “do not control  
 determinations of whether a person’s mental impairments rise to the level of a disability.”  
*Garrison v. Colvin*, 759 F.3d 995, 1002 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014).

1        “[T]he opinion of an examining doctor . . . can only be rejected for specific and  
2 legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” *Andrews v.*  
3 *Shalala*, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir.1995). The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out  
4 a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his  
5 interpretation thereof, and making findings. *See Thomas v. Barnhart*, 278 F.3d 947, 957  
6 (9th Cir. 2002). An ALJ need not specifically recite that she rejected a doctor’s opinion  
7 for enumerated reasons. *See Magallanes v. Bowen*, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989)  
8 (holding that an ALJ need not cite the magic words, “I reject the physician’s opinion  
9 because . . .”). Rather, a reviewing court may read the findings and opinion and draw  
10 specific and legitimate inferences. *See id.* (finding that courts are “not deprived of their  
11 faculties for drawing specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s opinion”); *see*  
12 *also Molina*, 674 F.3d at 1121 (“Even when an agency explains its decision with less than  
13 ideal clarity, we must uphold it if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”)  
14 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

15        An ALJ may consider the “supportability” of a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R.  
16 § 404.1527(c)(3); *see also* 20 C.F.R. 416.927(c)(3). In other words, “[t]he more a  
17 medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical  
18 signs and laboratory findings, the more weight [the Commissioner] will give that  
19 opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3); *see also* 20 C.F.R. 416.927(c)(3). Consequently,  
20 an ALJ may discount a medical opinion that is not adequately supported by objective  
21 medical findings. *See Batson v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th  
22 Cir. 2004). This is a specific and legitimate reason to reject a physician’s opinion. *See*

1   | *Thomas v. Barnhart*, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ALJ need not accept the  
 2 opinion of any physician . . . if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately  
 3 supported by clinical findings.”) (citing *Matney v. Sullivan*, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir.  
 4 1992)).

5                 Here, during Dr. Bragg’s examination, Mr. McIntire “became so agitated and  
 6 distressed when relaying the details of his dilemma [concerning his wife and child] that  
 7 he cried uncontrollably and also developed chest pains.” (Dkt # 11-14 at 62.) He “was  
 8 essentially unable to respond to other questions in the interview for at least the next 15  
 9 minutes.” (*Id.*) As a result, Dr. Bragg was unable to complete the psychological testing  
 10 or get “as much detailed information” as he would have liked. (*Id.* at 62, *see also id.* at  
 11 65 (noting insufficient time to complete certain tests due to Mr. McIntire’s level of  
 12 distress).) In addition, Dr. Bragg acknowledged that he was unable to get a “clear sense  
 13 of Axis I mental disorders” even though he diagnosed Mr. McIntire with various  
 14 impairments. (*Id.* at 62.) Mr. McIntire argues that the ALJ did not adequately explain  
 15 why, “due to claimant’s agitation,” Dr. Bragg’s opinion had questionable validity. (Op.  
 16 Mem. at 9.)

17                 When reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the court is not “deprived of [its] faculties for  
 18 drawing specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s opinion.” *Magallanes*, 881  
 19 F.2d at 751. Here, the ALJ thought that Dr. Bragg’s opinion should be given “little  
 20 weight” because Mr. McIntire was so upset during the examination that Dr. Bragg was  
 21 unable to complete his objective testing. (Dkt. # 11-2 at 27.) The court agrees with the  
 22 Commissioner that this is a legitimate and specific reason supported by substantial

1 evidence in the record for affording less weight to Dr. Bragg's opinion. Further  
 2 explanation by the ALJ is not required. Although the ALJ's findings concerning Dr.  
 3 Bragg may not have been the model of clarity, the court concludes that the ALJ did not  
 4 err in this portion of his decision.<sup>3</sup>

#### 5       **D. Mr. McIntire's Credibility**

6       The ALJ found that Mr. McIntire had established the existence of a medically  
 7 determinable impairment that reasonably could have caused his reported symptoms. (*See*  
 8 *id.* at 25.) Thus, the ALJ was required to consider Mr. McIntire's statements concerning  
 9 "the intensity and persistence" of his symptoms and "the extent to which [his] symptoms  
 10 limit [his] capacity for work." *See* 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. The ALJ,  
 11 nevertheless, found that Mr. McIntire was not fully credible in his statements concerning  
 12 his symptoms and their effects for a variety of reasons. (Dkt. # 11-2 at 25-26.) In finding  
 13 that Mr. McIntire was not "entirely credible," the ALJ was required to give "specific,  
 14 clear and convincing reasons." *Burrell v. Colvin*, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014)  
 15 ("Where, as here, Claimant has presented evidence of an underlying impairment and the

---

16  
 17       <sup>3</sup> Mr. McIntire also asserts that the ALJ improperly substituted his own lay understanding  
 18 for the opinion of Dr. Bragg. (Op. Mem. at 10.) The ALJ, however, may consider whether a  
 19 medical opinion is adequately supported by objective medical evidence. *See* 20 C.F.R.  
 20 §§404.1527(c)(3); 416.927(c)(3). The court finds no error in the ALJ doing so here.

21       Mr. McIntire also argues that the ALJ failed to consider "descriptions noted elsewhere in  
 22 the record" that were arguably consistent with Dr. Bragg's opinion. (Op. Mem. at 10-11.) As  
 23 the Commissioner points out, however, a claimant's alternative interpretation of the evidence  
 24 does not invalidate an ALJ's findings. *See Rollins v. Massanari*, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir.  
 25 2001); *Batson*, 359 F.3d at 1193 ("[I]f evidence exists to support more than one rational  
 26 interpretation, [the court] must defer to the Commissioner's decision."); *see also Arkansas v.*  
*Oklahoma*, 503 U.S. 91, 1060 (1992) ("The court should not supplant the agency's findings  
 27 merely by identifying alternative findings that could be supported by substantial evidence.").  
 Again, the court finds no error on this basis.

1 government does not argue that there is no evidence of malingering, [the court] review[s]  
 2 the ALJ's rejection of her testimony for 'specific, clear and convincing reasons.'")  
 3 (internal footnote omitted). Mr. McIntire contends that the reasons stated by the ALJ  
 4 failed to meet this standard. (Op. Mem. at 11-16.)

5 The Commissioner concedes that some of the reasons the ALJ provided for  
 6 finding Mr. McIntire not entirely credible "may not have been legally adequate or  
 7 supported by substantial evidence in the record." (Resp. at 8 (citing Dkt. # 11-2 at 25-  
 8 26).) Nevertheless, the Commissioner asserts that not every reason provided for  
 9 disregarding a claimant's credibility must be upheld so long as the ALJ's remaining  
 10 reasons are valid. In *Carmickle v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration*, the  
 11 Ninth Circuit stated:

12 Because we conclude that two of the ALJ's reasons supporting his adverse  
 13 credibility finding are invalid, we must determine whether the ALJ's  
 14 reliance on such reasons was harmless error. *See Batson v. Comm'r of Soc.*  
*Sec. Admin.*, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195-97 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying harmless  
 15 error standard where one of the ALJ's several reasons supporting an  
 16 adverse credibility finding was held invalid). Our decision in *Batson* makes  
 17 clear that reviewing the ALJ's credibility determination *where the ALJ*  
*provides specific reasons supporting such* is a substantive analysis. So long  
 18 as there remains "substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusions on . . .  
 19 credibility" and the error "does not negate the validity of the ALJ's  
 20 ultimate [credibility] conclusion," such is deemed harmless and does not  
 21 warrant reversal. *Id.* at 1197; *see also Stout*, 454 F.3d at 1055 (defining  
 22 harmless error as such error that is "inconsequential to the ultimate  
 nondisability determination").

23 *Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (italics in  
 24 original). Thus, the court must determine whether—despite any legally inadequate  
 25

1 reasons—the ALJ’s error was harmless and his credibly finding concerning Mr. McIntire  
2 remains supported by substantial evidence.

3       The Commissioner defends only two bases for the ALJ’s adverse credibility  
4 findings, and thus the court will consider only those two for substantial evidence. First,  
5 the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly found Mr. McIntire to be less than fully  
6 credible due to evidence that he tended to magnify his symptoms. (Resp. at 8 (citing Dkt.  
7 # 11-2 at 25).) Specifically, the ALJ stated:

8           The claimant magnifies his limitations and is not wholly credible. He said  
9 that he is unable to sit or stand for long periods and that he lies down daily.  
10 Yet, he enjoys activities like reading and playing chess, both of which  
11 require considerable sitting and concentration to be enjoyable. . . . [T]he  
12 claimant’s activities of daily living include cleaning his motor home  
13 weekly, preparing his own meals daily, and doing his laundry . . . . He  
14 regularly leaves his motor home to do weekly shopping for food and basic  
15 necessities . . . .

16 (Dkt. # 11-2 at 25.) Mr. McIntire asserts that there is no evidence in record about how  
17 frequently or how long he played chess or spent time reading or in what body positions  
18 he performed these activities. (Op. Mem. at 12.) Mr. McIntire argues that the ALJ’s  
19 presumption or speculation concerning the manner in which he performed these activities  
20 was error. (*See id.* at 12-13 (citing SSR 86-8 (“Reasonable inferences may be drawn, but  
21 presumptions, speculations and suppositions should not be substituted for evidence.”))).

22 Mr. McIntire also argues that it was improper for the ALJ to rely on his ability to perform  
23 daily activities like cleaning, cooking, and shopping, because performing these activities  
24 is not consistent with the ability to work on a regular and continuing basis. (*Id.* at 13.)

1       The court agrees that the ALJ erred in relying on the above described evidence and  
2 activities in making his adverse credibility finding. The court takes judicial notice of the  
3 fact that reading can be performed laying down and chess can be played standing up.  
4 The Commissioner points to no evidence in the record that Mr. McIntire performed these  
5 activities in a sitting position or that these activities “require considerable sitting . . . to be  
6 enjoyable.” (*See* Dkt. # 11-2 at 25.) This conclusion was based on the ALJ’s  
7 presumptions and speculations—not evidence in the record.

8           In finding Mr. McIntire “not wholly credible,” the ALJ also relied upon Mr.  
9 McIntire’s testimony concerning his ability to clean his motor home, cook, shop for  
10 groceries, and do his laundry. (*Id.*) The Ninth Circuit, however, has repeatedly stated  
11 “that the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities . . . does not in  
12 any way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability.” *Orn v. Astrue*, 495 F.3d  
13 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting *Vertigan v. Halter*, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir.  
14 2001)). Nevertheless, daily activities may be grounds for an adverse credibility finding  
15 “if a claimant is able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving  
16 the performance of physical functions that are transferrable to a work setting.” *Id.*  
17 (quoting *Fair v. Bowen*, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)); *see also Burch*, 400 F.3d at  
18 681 (stating that an adverse credibility finding based on activities may be proper “if a  
19 claimant engages in numerous daily activities involving skills that could be transferred to  
20 the workplace”). Here, the ALJ made neither required finding concerning Mr. McIntire’s  
21 daily activities—that the skills described were “transferrable” to a work setting or that  
22 Mr. McIntire spent a “substantial” part of his day engaged in such activities. (*See* Dkt.

1 # 11-2 at 25.) Accordingly, the court concludes that this basis for discounting Mr.  
2 McIntire's credibility is not supported by "substantial evidence."

3 Next, the Commissioner asserts that, despite other errors, the ALJ's credibility  
4 determination is supported by the ALJ's consideration of the medical evidence. (Resp. at  
5 9-10.) The Commissioner argues that the ALJ may consider objective medical evidence  
6 as an indicator to assist in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and  
7 persistence of Mr. McIntire's symptoms. (*Id.* at 9 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2)-  
8 (c)(4))).) However, the Commissioner admits that the ALJ's analysis of Mr. McIntire's  
9 pain score was in error because the score related to his shoulder and not his back. (*Id.*)  
10 The Commissioner nevertheless argues that the ALJ's adverse credibility finding is  
11 sufficiently supported by ALJ's conclusion that the diagnostic imaging of Mr. McIntire's  
12 musculoskeletal system is generally benign. (*Id.*) Mr. McIntire disputes the validity of  
13 the ALJ's conclusions concerning his diagnostic imaging (Op. Mem. at 16), but  
14 ultimately it does not matter whether the ALJ is correct in his analysis here or not. Even  
15 assuming the ALJ's analysis of Mr. McInitre's medical imaging is appropriately  
16 supported by the evidence, the ALJ may not discount Mr. McIntire's subjective pain  
17 testimony solely on this ground. "[O]nce a claimant produces objective medical evidence  
18 of an underlying impairment, an [ALJ] may not reject a claimant's subjective complaints  
19 based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged  
20 severity of pain." *Bunnell v. Sullivan*, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Yet,  
21 because the Commissioner has either conceded that the ALJ's other grounds for  
22 discounting Mr. McIntire's credibility were not valid (*see* Resp. at 8) or the court has

1 rejected them (*see supra* at 12-14), this is the only basis that remains to underpin the  
2 ALJ's credibility finding. Ninth Circuit authority prohibits rejecting Mr. McIntire's  
3 subjective complaints on this basis alone. *See Rollins v. Massanari*, 261 F.3d 853, 856-  
4 57 (9th Cir. 2001); *Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[A]  
5 finding that the claimant lacks credibility cannot be premised wholly on a lack of medical  
6 support for the severity of his pain."); *Lester v. Chater*, 81 f.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)  
7 ("Once the claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the  
8 Commissioner may not discredit the claimant's testimony as to subjective symptoms  
9 because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence."); *see also Cotton v.*  
10 *Bowen*, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986) ("'Excess pain' is, by definition, pain that is  
11 unsupported by objective medical findings.").

12 There may well be valid grounds in the record to discount Mr. McIntire's  
13 credibility, but the ALJ failed to articulate them here. Neither may the court search for  
14 these reasons in the record. Although the court must review the record as a whole, it may  
15 review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision "and may not affirm the ALJ on  
16 a ground upon which he did not rely." *Orn*, 495 F.3d at 630. Accordingly, the court  
17 concludes that the ALJ's conclusion (as he articulated it) that Mr. McIntire was not  
18 "entirely credible" is not supported by clear, specific and convincing reasons.

19           **E. Remand**

20           Mr. McIntire argues that the court should remand for an award of benefits under  
21 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Op. Mem. at 17.) The court agrees with the Commissioner,  
22 however, that a finding of disability is not an appropriate remedy here. (See Resp. at 10-

1 11.) Instead, the court will remand for further administrative proceedings consistent with  
2 this order.

3       The choice whether to reverse and remand for further administrative proceedings,  
4 or to reverse and simply award benefits, is within the discretion of the court. *See Harman*  
5 *v. Apfel*, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court's decision  
6 whether to remand for further proceedings or payment of benefits is discretionary and is  
7 subject to review for abuse of discretion). The Ninth Circuit counsels that the court  
8 should grant an immediate award of benefits when these three conditions are met:

9           (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting  
10 such evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved  
11 before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the  
record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were  
such evidence credited.

12 *Id.* at 1178 (quoting *Smolen v. Chater*, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996)). If this test is  
13 satisfied with respect to the evidence in question, “then remand for determination and  
14 payment of benefits is warranted regardless of whether the ALJ might have articulated a  
15 justification for rejecting” the improperly discredited evidence. *Harman*, 211 F.3d at  
16 1179. After evaluating the record as a whole, however, if serious doubts remain  
17 concerning whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled, the court may exercise its discretion  
18 and remand the case for further administrative proceedings. *Garrison v. Colvin*, 759 F.3d  
19 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014); *Connett v. Barnhart*, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003). In  
20 addition, further administrative proceedings are useful if the record is not free from  
21 conflicts, all factual issues have not been resolved, or the claimant’s entitlement to

1 benefits is not clear. *Treichler v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 775 F.3d 1090, 1103-04 (9th  
2 Cir. 2014.)

3 Based on the foregoing guidance, the court finds that remand for further  
4 administrative proceedings is the appropriate remedy here. All factual issues have not  
5 been resolved. Further, even after the ALJ corrects the errors referenced above on  
6 remand, Mr. McIntire's entitlement to benefits is not clear. Thus, the court remands for  
7 further administrative proceedings consistent with this order and to resolve remaining  
8 factual issues and conflicts in the record.

9 **IV. CONCLUSION**

10 Based on the stated reasons and the relevant record, the court ORDERS that the  
11 Commissioner's decision finding that Mr. McIntire is not disabled is REVERSED and  
12 the matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to  
13 sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court DIRECTS the clerk to enter JUDGMENT  
14 for Mr. McIntire and to close this case.

15 Dated this 15th day of July, 2015.

16  
17   
18

19 JAMES L. ROBART  
United States District Judge  
20  
21  
22